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Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
A Global Health Challenge
In May 2013, World Health Organization (WHO) Direc-
tor-General Margaret Chan warned that a novel corona-
virus, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS-CoV), posed “a threat to the entire world.”1 Her
warning was prescient. As of June 12, 2015, WHO had
been notified of 1289 individuals with laboratory-
confirmed infections in 25 countries, of whom at least
455 individuals (37%) had died.2 More than 85% of cases
have been diagnosed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Unlike the distantly related, more contagious, but
less fatal severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavi-
rus (SARS-CoV), MERS-CoV had not been publicly linked
to a “super-spreading” event (1 patient linked to 10 in-
fections) until May 2015 in the Republic of Korea. When
the index case, a man aged 68 years from the Republic
of Korea, returned to Incheon International Airport (lo-
cated 30 miles west of Seoul) on May 4, he was asymp-
tomatic. He reportedly had traveled to Bahrain, United
Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Qatar,
but initially declared travel only to outbreak-free Bah-
rain. He became symptomatic on May 11 and sought care
in 2 outpatient clinics and 2 hospitals. He was eventu-
ally admitted to Pyeongtaek St Mary’s hospital, Gyeonggi
province, but MERS-CoV was unconfirmed until May 20,
reportedly initiating chains of transmission that in-
creased to involve 126 cases with 11 deaths as of June 10.
The index patient was still hospitalized as of June 12.
China reported a MERS-CoV case on May 29, 2015—a
man aged 44 years from the Republic of Korea who flew to
Hong Kong on May 26, subsequently traveling to Huizhou,
Guangdongprovince,wherehewasplacedinisolation.Ge-
netic sequencing showed no MERS-CoV mutations.
Origins, Epidemiology, and Clinical Features
MERS is a viral respiratory illness novel to humans. First
reported in Jeddah, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in June
2012, the earliest outbreak occurred in March or April of
2012 in Zarqa, Jordan, with 9 laboratory-confirmed
cases. The outbreak was retrospectively linked to MERS-
CoV using frozen specimens.3,4
MERS is a zoonotic disease, with dromedary cam-
els the likely animal reservoir. Transmission risk factors
include respiratory exposure to camel secretions, drink-
ing raw camel milk, or eating undercooked camel meat.
Studies report increased risk in individuals with occu-
pational contact with camels.5
MERS-CoVistransmissibleperson-to-person,butsus-
tained community transmission has not been observed.
Like SARS-CoV, health care settings pose the highest risk.
Yet MERS-CoV is less contagious than SARS-CoV and has
higher fatality rates. Hospital-related outbreaks have oc-
curred in multiple countries, including substantial nosoco-
mial transmissions across the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
MERS typically presents as a nonspecific febrile re-
spiratory tract infection, but can progress rapidly to re-
spiratory failure, or it may never become severe. Thus
far, children have rarely contracted or died from MERS-
CoV. Risk factors for disease progression include comor-
bidity with lung disease, kidney disease, diabetes, and
immunodeficiency.
A Global Health Emergency?
The WHO director-general has convened 8 Emergency
Committee meetings on MERS under the International
Health Regulations, declining to declare a Public Health
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). Given the
ongoing outbreak, the director-general convened the
ninth meeting on June 16, with 2 major events in mind:
the month of Ramadan, which begins June 17 with a
surge in travelers and pilgrims performing the Umrah pil-
grimage in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Hajj pil-
grimage, the largest gathering in the world, which oc-
curs September 20 through 25.
WHO was sharply criticized for delays in declaring
Ebola a PHEIC, but that should not provoke an overre-
action to MERS-CoV. WHO should amend the Interna-
tional Health Regulations to grant the director-general
flexibility to designate graduated alert levels, from
heightened vigilance, rising to a PHEIC only when justi-
fied. On June 13, WHO and the Republic of Korea pre-
sented the results of a joint mission to understand the
virus and its transmission patterns.
Public Health Strategies
Public health measures—infection prevention and con-
trol, isolation, contact tracing, and quarantine—
historically have controlled MERS-CoV and were also
widely employed during SARS and Ebola outbreaks.
Transparency and Trust
Public fear and mistrust in government can impede epi-
demic response. The MERS-CoV outbreak in the Repub-
lic of Korea occurred in the aftermath of the Sewol ferry
disaster in April 2014, which resulted in the deaths of 304
students. The government of the Republic of Korea was
criticized for what some perceived to be an uncoordi-
nated response and government obfuscation. In the case
of MERS-CoV, health authorities initially withheld the
names of hospitals handling cases. Transparency builds
public trust; given inevitable scientific uncertainty, health
authorities should fully disclose what is and is not known
about the MERS-CoV outbreak.
Community and Health Care Settings
MERS-CoV, like other coronaviruses, spreads through re-
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mended. The Republic of Korea has seen a surge in hand sanitizers,
as well as face masks.6 WHO recommends health worker precau-
tions (eg, contact and droplet protective equipment), as well as air-
borne precautions for aerosol-generating procedures. Crowded hos-
pitals and comingling of health workers, patients, and family
members likely contribute to transmission in health care settings.7
Early identification can prevent transmission and requires careful
travel histories for differential diagnosis. Health worker training on
infection prevention and control, as well as diagnostic testing of cer-
tain travelers, remains critical for an effective response.
Isolation and Quarantine
Isolation of patients with a known infection is recommended, but
optimal implementation of quarantine for exposed individuals is
more controversial (home-based, medical facility, or special hous-
ing). For example, the cordon sanitaire (a guarded line preventing
residents from leaving) to control Ebola provoked violence in Mon-
rovia, Liberia. During the SARS outbreak of 2003, China and Singa-
pore employed mass quarantines in apartment complexes or other
structures, monitored by armed guards or ankle bracelets. The Re-
public of Korea placed more than 3000 individuals exposed to
MERS-CoV in quarantine, mostly at home, but some in state-
designated facilities. Authorities were tracking cell phone signals to
monitor patient compliance. To gain public trust, quarantines should
be limited to well-documented exposures using the least restric-
tive means possible.
Travel Restrictions
The Republic of Korea restricted the travel of quarantined MERS-
CoV contacts following a security breach allowing a quarantined pa-
tient to fly to Hong Kong. The traveler denied MERS-CoV exposure,
even though he was febrile on arrival. He was then allowed to pro-
ceed by bus to Guangdong province where he tested positive for
MERS-CoV. Hong Kong issued a “red alert” advising against unnec-
essary travel to the Republic of Korea—a decision likely to be fol-
lowed by other countries. This contravenes WHO guidance, which
finds travel restrictions ineffective due to lack of community trans-
mission.
School Closures
More than 2400 kindergartens, schools, and universities were closed
in the Republic of Korea, despite Ministry of Health guidance that it
was “medically wrong,” too drastic a precaution given disruptions in
child education.6 WHO has urged the reopening of schools, and the
Republic of Korea has begun doing so. School closures may have a
role with novel influenzas, but are unproven for MERS-CoV given the
lack of community transmission.
Who Owns MERS-CoV?
In June 2012, a microbiologist in Jeddah sent blood samples from a
patient with unexplained pneumonia to Erasmus Medical Center, the
Netherlands, which identified a novel coronavirus later confirmed
as MERS-CoV. Erasmus then shared samples with multiple labora-
tories under material transfer agreements, contracts for transfer-
ring pathogens. Erasmus filed for patents on the use of the MERS-
CoV gene sequence. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia warned that the
microbiologist violated national rules and that Erasmus acted
unethically.8
Following Indonesia’s refusal to share influenza A(H5N1), WHO
adopted the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework in May
2011, governing virus sharing. This framework, however, fails to cover
noninfluenza pathogens. Impediments to virus sharing, restrictive
material transfer agreements, and patents can impede research on
novel pathogens. In May 2013, Dr Chan stated, “No [intellectual prop-
erty] should stand in the way of you, the countries of the world, to
protect your people.”8 Yet there remain substantial holes in inter-
national rules needed to facilitate critical research.
Strengthening Health Systems
A critical lesson from SARS, Ebola, and now MERS is that health set-
tings can amplify transmission risks. Historically, health settings have
exposed patients and visitors due to close contact that facilitates
spread of respiratory tract secretions and infected body fluids, as
well as health workers who have not employed personal protective
equipment. However, a well-trained and well-prepared health work-
force—both health care and public health—usually can rapidly bring
outbreaks under control. The International Health Regulations re-
quire all states to build core capacities, including diagnosis, treat-
ment, laboratories, contact tracing, isolation, and humane forms of
quarantine. Fully funding and implementing that international ob-
ligation offers the best assurance of global health security. The on-
going outbreak in the Republic of Korea is an important reminder
that MERS requires constant vigilance and can be brought under con-
trol with effective public health strategies.
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